My project came about as a result of my desire to increase my understanding of the coup in Chile in 1973. In several Spanish classes I had learned a little bit about Salvador Allende and the disputes among the Chilean people and historians alike about the nature of his death in the coup. I was interested in the continuing historiographical controversies surrounding the coup, and particularly in the involvement of the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States. Initially I hoped to research CIA involvement and take a position in my paper about whether this involvement had been over- or understated by mainstream historians. However, I found the facts of the coup to be difficult to discern because the debate was highly politicized. The language of each side seemed to play an important role in how the coup was framed by various participants in these debates. Through conversations with Professor Salchak and my own observations about the vastly different ways people from opposing ends of the political spectrum discussed Allende, I begin to shift my perspective from a historical to a linguistic perspective.

At first I wanted to focus solely on the way the US government portrayed Allende before the coup. I was excited by the prospect of archival research in the Chile Declassification Project initiated by the Clinton administration. This collection includes over 2100 previously classified State Department and CIA documents about United States action in Chile during the 1960s and 1970s. However, after reading more than 20 seemingly promising documents and finding that the most crucial information was still blacked out, I decided I had to move beyond the archives, and this is why the documents from the CIA archive do not play a large part in my paper. Tolonda, my UW librarian, suggested I take an approach more focused on media coverage of Allende. She helped me locate the New York Times historical database (which I eventually used for a term
paper in my International History of the Cold War class.) Here I found many articles covering Chile and was able to select a single article that seemed to represent the range of coverage in the archive. The author of the piece I chose (Text Three in the paper) had written the majority of articles on Chile in the period from 1972-1973, so I felt that this reflected coverage of Chile, at least in the New York Times, during that period. Tolonda also helped me find important secondary sources, particularly the Falcoff book that provided excellent explanations of the economic and political crises which contributed to instability in Chile during Allende’s presidency.

Source selection was pivotal to the paper because I strove to critically and deeply engage four very different sources as the bulk of my paper and as evidence for my argument. In Professor Salchak’s University Writing course we spent a great deal of time on the selection of appropriate sources, and more importantly, approaching chosen sources critically. Professor Salchak emphasizes treating all sources with skepticism, and acknowledging that authors bring their own biases and agenda to their writing. Not only did this emphasis help me shape my research topic from a political/historical perspective on the Chilean coup to a linguistic one, but it gave me a strong foundation for criticizing and deconstructing the sources I chose. Heavy reliance on primary sources allowed me to circumvent a lot of the issues of evaluating the accuracy of sources. The paper is not about coming up with an equivocal answer to questions of CIA involvement or Allende’s suicide, but rather to demonstrate that linguistic choice and the media played a role in formulating the US’s response to Allende’s election.

The element of this research paper I am most proud of is the process. Often when writing papers previous to this one, I was unwilling to dramatically change my argument or focus based on what I found from initial research. This is partly a function of working to a deadline, because
it is difficult to abandon a whole day or two of work on one area of research because it does not seem to be fruitful, as I had to do with the CIA archives. Leaving myself open to changes in the project and suggestions from my librarian and Professor Salchak helped me find an interesting area of the topic which also had plenty of space for creating an argumentative paper.
The role of the United States in the affairs of other nations has long been the source of heated ideological debate. Yet there has been limited effort by scholars to examine how rhetoric and metaphor have instigated, replicated, and legitimized foreign interventions. This paper addresses this issue by examining a variety of primary texts concerning a specific intervention: that of the U.S. in the Chilean coup of 1973. A Critical Discourse Analysis approach is used to identify key words and rhetorical strategies that were employed by a variety of actors to frame the debate about the legitimacy of U.S. actions. The Chilean case has significance for the wider body of literature that uses linguistic strategies to understand how policy formation and public discourse about foreign interventions occurred in the United States during the Cold War.

**Lens: Critical Discourse Analysis**

Critical Discourse Analysis is an emerging field that applies linguistic concepts to nontraditional texts such as political speeches and popular media. As Teun van Dijk explains in his “Introduction to Critical Discourse Analysis,” it is “a type of discourse analytical research that primarily studies the way social power abuse, dominance, and inequality are enacted, reproduced, and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context” (p. 352). This paper studies how the dominance of conservative narratives about Allende’s presidency enacted and reproduced anticommunist ideology during the Cold War. My lens is constructed in this manner, emphasizing rhetorical and linguistic choices in an analysis of contemporary documents in search of metaphors and key words that influenced decision-making and reinforced an interventionist paradigm in the Nixon administration.

In this paper I apply the Critical Discourse lens to four representational texts that illustrate the views of a variety of U.S. participants in the rhetorical war of words surrounding U.S. action in Chile. The first, a memorandum from Henry Kissinger to Richard Nixon, is meant to illustrate how the conservative U.S. administration used language to achieve their objectives
in relation to Allende. The second text, an article from the mainstream media, shows that the conservative view of Allende was being conveyed to the public through popular media. Next, I examine a counterexample of media portrayals of Allende by analyzing an article from a leftist magazine in order to obtain an understanding of the way leftists were combating conservative narratives with their own portrayals of Allende. Finally, a congressional hearing conducted by liberal congressmen interviewing a member of the Nixon administration shows the way the two visions of Allende and the Chilean political climate interacted and responded to one another. It is concluded from this analytical work that conservative narratives were used to legitimize U.S. intervention to remove Allende from power.

**Context**

Chile is significant because of its symbolic status as a site of contestation between communists and anticommunists during the Cold War. In the preface to his *History of Modern Chile*, Mark Falcoff calls Chile “one of the great political causes of our time” (p. ix). Falcoff further writes that leftists in the U.S. and abroad see the coup as “an indictment of the liberal capitalist order and the role of the United States in world affairs” (p. ix). Allende was the first democratically elected Marxist leader in the world, and the course of his presidency was important to the broader trends of the Cold War.

For those on either side of the debate, a “victory”, either proving or disproving the claim that U.S. national security interests played a role in unseating a democratically elected leader, would be significant. A victory for the left in framing Allende’s overthrow would place the event in a category with other “illegitimate” or covert U.S. actions during the Cold War: the overthrow of President Arbenz in Guatemala, intervention in the Dominican Republic, and the funding of Nicaraguan paramilitaries to prevent revolution there in the mid-1970s.
Some fascinating work has already been done to examine the rhetoric of the Nixon administration, particularly relating to the Vietnam War. Writing in 1972, Michael Skidmore noted that when pressed to explain its actions in Southeast Asia, “the American government now seems often to turn to the techniques of deliberate language manipulation practiced by the totalitarians” (p. 3). As a result of this linguistic maneuvering, Skidmore argued “no longer is it possible accurately to grasp any sense of meaning from the words defense, victory, free world, aggression, national security, patriotism, police action…” (p. 7). It is against this backdrop that intervention in the Chilean coup took place, and this article will demonstrate that even in internal documents the Nixon administration employed similar metaphors of freedom, national interests and defense.

While some work has been done to apply Critical Discourse Analysis approaches to U.S. Cold War strategy (see, for example, Mälksoo; Le; and Chilton), there is a deficit in the literature with regard to Latin America. In both politics and history, U.S. interventions in Latin America during the Cold War have been controversial, yet there has been little or no effort made by linguists to elucidate these debates by highlighting the significance of language in shaping U.S. strategy and public opinion of Latin American affairs. I now engage in a close reading of several primary documents to understand the rhetorical strategies of the Nixon administration and its opponents in framing Allende and U.S. intervention in his overthrow.

For liberals, portraying Allende not only as a wholly legitimate and democratically elected leader, but also as a victim of U.S. neoimperialism is the primary goal. This sentiment is conveyed through language. On the opposite side of the debate, conservatives emphasize the crises, both economic and political, that were playing out in Chile in 1973 and tend to employ rhetorically powerful words like “illegitimate”, “crisis”, and “danger” when referring to Allende
and the political situation in Chile. Members of the Nixon administration and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) also use words like “incursion” and “operations” to minimize and sanitize the nature of U.S. assistance to the military junta (CIA 1970). Through four close readings I examine how conservatives framed Allende as a threat in order to advance ideological goals and justify intervention.

**Texts**

**Text One: Memorandum from Henry Kissinger to Richard M. Nixon**

On November 5, 1970, then-National Security Advisor to President Richard Nixon Henry Kissinger sent a memorandum to Nixon in preparation for a November 6 th meeting to discuss the situation in Chile following Allende’s inauguration on November 5 th. This memorandum was classified “secret/sensitive,” and laid out three possible courses of action in response to Allende’s election. These approaches included what Kissinger called the “Modus Vivendi” approach, advocated by the State Department, and two types of “Hostile Approaches” advocated by the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, a minority of State Department officials and Kissinger himself. The Modus Vivendi Approach held that U.S. efforts to undermine Allende economically or militarily would only serve to increase Chilean support for Allende by strengthening anti-U.S. sentiment in the country and argued that internal weaknesses in Allende’s fragmented political coalition would prevent his consolidation without the need for U.S. action (Kissinger p. 5). On the other hand, Hostile Approach proponents thought that some form of U.S. economic, and possibly military, action should be taken to undermine Allende, but differed over whether this action should be overt or covert (Kissinger p. 6).

A close reading of the text of the memo reveals Kissinger’s efforts to portray Allende as a great threat to the United States. Kissinger was capitalizing on his power advantage over Nixon
in terms of knowledge and information, which Critical Discourse Analysts identify as an important tool for exercising power in rhetorical situations (van Dijk p. 4). As Nixon’s National Security Advisor, Kissinger was the more authoritative of the two men in the conversation about appropriate response to a perceived national security threat.

In reporting each approach to Nixon, Kissinger subtly emphasizes his authority by noting the coalitional nature of supporters of his favored approach, implying that while only one group, the State department, favored Modus Vivendi, a variety of knowledgeable security experts from several agencies supported Kissinger. He introduces the Hostile Approach by noting “DOD, CIA and some State people, on the other hand, argue that it is patent that Allende is our enemy, that he will move counter to us just as soon and as strongly as he can” (Kissinger p. 5). Also of note in this portion of the memo is Kissinger’s ambiguous use of “our” when referring to Allende as “our enemy.” In his introduction to Critical Discourse Analysis, van Dijk explains that the construction of ambiguous us/them binaries such as Kissinger employs here has empirically been used to mobilize groups or individuals in support of political goals (p. 8). Kissinger constructs vague threats and the illusion of a broad coalition in support of intervention among experts to convince Nixon to intervene.

There are several other elements of the memo that implicitly or explicitly characterize Allende as a threat to U.S. security interests. Most tellingly, Kissinger begins the memo by noting that “the election of Allende as President of Chile poses for us one of the most serious challenges ever faced in this hemisphere” (p. 1). This is clearly an exaggeration as Allende had come to power peacefully and had expressed no intention of attacking the U.S. or any other country (Winn p. 140). Yet this statement sets the tone for the entire memo, which uses the word “threat” three times in eight pages and “danger” or “dangerous” four times.
In the memorandum, Kissinger also strives to situate Allende’s election in the broader context of the Cold War. The possible alliance or “linkage” of Allende with Cuba and the USSR is mentioned no fewer than three times. In 1970, when the memo was written, few more serious claims could be made than a potential increase in the number of Soviet satellites and the repetition of this phrase serves to subconsciously reinforce and increase its significance as a way to convince Nixon that intervention was necessary. For example, Kissinger writes that, “In fact, as noted, an ‘independent’ rational socialist state linked to Cuba and the USSR can be even more dangerous for our long-term interests than a very radical regime” (p. 7). He also perpetuates the ideological dichotomy that was so firmly entrenched in Cold War rhetoric, claiming that the ramifications of what Nixon decided about Allende would “have an effect on what happens in the rest of Latin America and the rest of the developing world; on what our future position will be in the hemisphere; and on the larger world picture, including our relations with the USSR. They will even affect our own conception of what our role in the world is” (p. 1). By situating Allende’s electoral victory in the context in a broader ideological narrative that Nixon could identify with, Kissinger increased the immediacy of the threat Allende posed.

Kissinger also tries to preempt liberal objections to intervening in Chile. He recognizes that the prospect of intervention in Chile presented “very painful dilemmas” for the U.S. because Allende was elected democratically (p. 2). However, Kissinger does not pose these dilemmas as ideological ones—his linguistic choices indicate that these are rational cost-benefit dilemmas rather than moral/ideological ones. In framing these dilemmas, he reminds Nixon that “We are strongly on record in support of self-determination and respect for free elections; you are firmly on record for non-intervention in the internal affairs of this hemisphere and of accepting nations ‘as they are.’ It would therefore be very costly for us to act in ways that appear to violate those
principles” (p. 2). Rather than considering the constitutional or moral reasons that might prevent leaders who propounded self-determination from intervening in the affairs of another democratically elected government, Kissinger is purely concerned with the public opinion costs associated with intervention.

Kissinger then notes that “Allende…has legitimacy in the eyes of Chileans and most of the world; there is nothing we can do to deny him that legitimacy or claim that he does not have it” (p. 2). Yet Kissinger himself does not concede anywhere in the memo that Allende is the legitimate leader of Chile, only that he is perceived that way. This distinction is important—this rhetorical choice hints to Nixon that Allende is not necessarily legitimate. Finally, Kissinger affirms the morality of intervening in Chilean politics by noting in his summary of the Hostile Approach that “there is in fact some virtue in posturing ourselves in a position of opposition” (p. 7). By circumventing questions of Allende’s legitimacy and even suggesting that intervention was ultimately the “moral” course of action, Kissinger’s rhetoric persuaded Nixon to act.

While Critical Discourse Analysis traditionally focuses on public texts and this is a highly classified document, its implications for political outcomes are clearly significant because of the text’s intended audience. If Kissinger convinced Nixon, the president of the United States, that Allende was a threat, that would trigger U.S. intervention in Chile, particularly because these actions were covert and no congressional approval was necessary (Falcoff p. 230). Gregory Wagner also notes that, “contemporary politicians are frequently their own most enchanted listeners” meaning that the memo may have played an important role in reinforcing the beliefs of the small number of security experts who had access to the memo and strengthening their own belief in the righteousness of intervention (p. 71).
The themes in the Kissinger memo to Nixon are not only deployed in rhetorically persuasive security metaphor, but Kissinger repeats these themes to reinforce their significance. These repeated themes include the potential Chile-Cuba-USSR alliance, key words like “danger” and “threat”, and rhetorical maneuvering that ignores the question of Allende’s legitimacy. In all these ways, the memo convinced Kissinger as well as Nixon to pursue the covert Hostile Approach favored by Kissinger.

Text Two: Main-Stream Media

Popular media may also be subject to Critical Discourse Analysis to judge whether the national security metaphors used by the government were being conveyed to the public. It is difficult to demonstrate how media portrayals of Allende were translated into policy. However, if it can be shown that these representations of Allende reflected either the views of the Nixon administration or the political left regarding U.S. involvement in the coup, this would also have significance because it could demonstrate which side was “winning” the contest over language. In this text, a New York Times article from just two days before the coup, the author, Martin Howe, describes the tense political situation in Chile, citing Allende’s struggle to maintain power in the face of mounting Congressional opposition and a failed military coup attempt in June. The article alludes to the likelihood of another coup attempt.

The metaphors of insecurity and instability could not be more evident in this piece. The word “crisis” appears no less than six times in the one page article, alongside “apocalyptic”, “class war(fare)”, “uncertainty” and “extremism.” The article deploys metaphors of (in)security to heighten fears of Chilean instability using these rhetorically powerful words. While the situation in Chile immediately preceding the coup was certainly tense and unstable, it could hardly be called “apocalyptic” nor was it emblematic of all-out class warfare. Rather it was a
political contest between the right-wing Christian Democrats, moderates and Allende’s socialist coalition (Falcoff p. 264). The hyperbolic rhetorical choices made by the author reflect the success of efforts to portray Allende as a threat, and implicitly legitimize efforts to remove him from power to stabilize Chilean politics.

In addition, the content of the article signifies growing public concern in the U.S. over the Chilean situation. The article appears to relate no particular news story in Chile, but rather constructs an account of the instability of Chilean politics over the course of several months. The insecurity itself, rather than an event, is the news. Interestingly, the author also notes that in the current conditions it would be “easy to finance a coup.” While no judgment is passed on whether this coup would be beneficial or not, the fact that it appears at all indicates to the reader that a coup may be imminent. It is possible that recognizing that intervention would be financially feasible may have made it easier for the public to accept limited intervention by the government, as long as it did not strain the public’s wallet. The content of the article, with its vague subject matter that serves only to reinforce the narrative of instability and its discussion of the feasibility of organizing a coup, demonstrates that even news from a mainstream, historically left-leaning publication like the New York Times had begun to reflect the Nixon administration’s metaphors of insecurity and intervention.

**Text Three: Left-wing Media**

A piece called “True Verdict on Allende” from October 29th in the left-wing magazine “The Nation” illustrates the way the left framed Allende. Unlike Howe’s article in the New York Times, this piece does not reflect mainstream views of Allende. The author, E.B. Burns, is quick to differentiate his own perspective from that of “most commentators” who he claims “rationalize the violent demise of Chile’s democracy” (p. 422). He also writes that “the news
media have emphasized the failures of the Allende’s government” (p. 423). In differentiating his leftist approach to covering Allende from other news sources, Burns recognizes that conservative constructions of Allende have become dominant in popular media.

The left is hasty to emphasize Allende’s importance in the broader Cold War struggle. While Kissinger called Allende’s victory one of the greatest threats of the hemisphere, Burns writes that “the military uprising in Chile on September 11 is the most significant event to occur in Latin America since Fidel Castro entered Havana in 1959” (p. 425-26), and claims that “the repercussions will be felt throughout the next generation” (p. 426). These phrases are evidence that both sides considered Chile to be an important site of struggle between communist and capitalist forces.

The most striking metaphor Burns uses in this article is one of victimization and violence. The metaphor begins with the article’s subtitle: “Reform gunned down” (p. 422). By portraying reform as the victim of military power, Allende is valorized and the interventionists are depicted as murderers. This metaphor is heightened with Burns’ subsequent choices of imagery of “burned out shambles”, “echoed to boots of soldiers”, and “rattling of machine guns,” which all recall military atrocities. Most explicitly, Burns writes that “Chilean reforms and democracy fell victims to the middle class’s frantic desire to regain power at any price” (422). The metaphor of victimization plays out through this imagery and is reinforced by the article’s title.

**Text Four: Congressional Hearing**

On September 20th, 1973, the House Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs held a hearing with assistant secretary of state for Inter-American affairs Jack Kubisch to investigate and understand the events of the coup nine days earlier. The Subcommittee was dominated by liberal House members, and an examination of their exchanges with Mr. Kubisch, an appointee
of President Nixon, reveal the clash of ideologies between liberals and conservatives following the coup. In the small selection presented here, Benjamin Rosenthal, a Democrat from New York, interrogates Mr. Kubisch about his claim in his opening remarks to the committee that the coup may have been in Chile’s best interest.

Mr. Rosenthal first poses what he calls a “broad, philosophical question” to Kubisch:

…you said, in substance, it is up to the Chileans to decide on their government. I think you said they can decide for themselves; it is not up to us. But does that include a military takeover of a government? In other words, when you say, in broad terms, ‘They can decide,’ it would seem to me that that excludes a military takeover, where they didn’t decide, but where someone decided for them. Then our relations with that government must be tempered by the fact that it was not democratically initiated…the people didn’t decide” (p. 101).

This introduces Rosenthal’s subsequent theme that Allende was popularly elected and thus was a more legitimate leader of Chile than the military junta, and that the U.S. should not even recognize or deal with such regimes. As a member of the political left, Rosenthal depicts Allende as a righteous, democratic leader with the will of the Chilean people behind him, while Kubisch persists in reiterating the right’s questioning of Allende’s continued legitimacy.

This narrative of Allende’s illegitimacy is evident in Kubisch’s response to Rosenthal. He states that he “would not want to make a judgment as to whether the Allende regime that has just been overthrown or the government that has come to power in Chile in the last week is more representative of the wishes and desires of the people of the country” (p. 101). Two points are noteworthy about his response. First, by even allowing the possibility that a military junta’s rule may be as legitimate as a democratically elected leader, Kubisch expresses his belief that Allende was a dangerous or wildly unpopular president. In fact, Allende’s party had won the midterm elections of 1973 with almost the same percentage of the vote Allende had garnered in 1970 (Falcoff p. 252). Second, Kubisch here refers to a new government “coming to power” in Chile. His choice of verb is interesting; it obscures the violent nature of the coup, and ignores the
manner of the junta’s ascendance to power. Indeed, he consistently refers to the new government “coming to power” rather than the liberal congressman’s representation of the coup as “seizing power” and as “a great tragedy” visited “on our sister hemisphere nation” (p. 93). This use of “coming to power” versus “seizing” or “taking” may also be a subtle strategy of communicating that the junta was not in fact illegitimate.

Rosenthal does not let these remarks slide. Instead, he fires back that, “The displaced government obtained power in an election, good, bad, or otherwise” (p. 101). Obviously this is meant to again emphasize Rosenthal’s view that legitimacy is achieved only through elections and that the U.S. government should have accepted these election results regardless of how U.S. officials felt about the Allende government. The exchange continues, with Kubisch maintaining that Allende’s unpopularity may have justified the coup:

Mr. Kubisch: Yes. But, in recent months, there were all kinds of demonstrations and calls for Allende to resign…they were calling on the government to resign because they felt it was no longer representative of the people.
Mr. Rosenthal: You are not suggesting that when there is a popular call for the resignation of a government and the military force is activated by that call, that this is representative government?
Mr. Kubisch: No sir. What I am saying is that I don’t want to make a judgment about what government would be most representative of the desires of the people of Chile. Obviously, elections are the best way to determine that.
Mr. Rosenthal: And should, in fact, be the only way that we can deal with government?
Mr. Kubisch: I don’t think I could agree with that Mr. Rosenthal, I believe the United States must deal with governments as they are…” (p. 101)

Again, it is possible to see leftist and rightist versions of the coup and Allende’s legitimacy colliding here in the ways described in the preceding paragraph. It’s interesting to note what the inverse of Mr. Rosenthal’s concluding comment and Mr. Kubisch’s answer imply: not only does the junta’s undemocratic ascendance to power mean that the U.S. should not intervene when leaders are elected democratically, that in fact the U.S. should truly have dealt with the Allende
government as it was, rather than provide economic and military assistance to Allende’s opposition.

**Conclusions**

On the right, Allende is targeted as politically illegitimate and a fundamental threat to U.S. interests in Latin America and around the globe. This group portrays the Chilean situation in 1973 as highly unstable. The Nixon administration figures prominently in this group. A microcosm of the larger debate over Allende’s identity and the threat he posed to American interests in Latin America is evident in the Nixon administration’s internal debates about the extent to which the U.S. could or should intervene, with Henry Kissinger being the primary proponent of the conservative view of Allende. An important part of the right’s argument is that Allende’s path to socialism was not endorsed by a majority of the population. CIA and State Department documents emphasize the divisions among members of Allende’s coalition and the plurality, rather than a majority, which he obtained in the 1970 presidential election. The right also used media outlets to publicize the Chilean Congress’s investigations into Allende’s alleged constitutional violations in the early part of 1973.

The left lauds Allende’s election in 1970 as an emblematic communist victory because he was the first democratically elected Marxist in Latin America. Supporters of Allende point to the hypocrisy of U.S. aid to overthrow a democratically elected leader despite U.S. calls for self-determination in Soviet-controlled Eastern Europe. In the left’s narrative, American neoimperialism is the villain that insidiously undermines its righteous, legitimate challenger, Salvador Allende. This metaphor of an “unholy union” between U.S. government and industry reinforces the claim of neoliberal hegemony.
It appears that the Nixon administration embraced and replicated portrayals of Salvador Allende as a threat to U.S. national security to legitimize intervention, and it successfully conveyed these narratives to the public through mass media. The conservative “victory” in framing Chilean intervention has implications for the wider struggle between liberal and conservative debates over the legitimacy of U.S. interventions throughout the world during the Cold War and for scholarly investigations of the causes of intervention. Rhetoric and public opinion influenced Nixon’s decision calculus when he decided to intervene.

The findings of this paper have broader implications. It has been demonstrated that rhetorical choices and language had an important effect on framing the debate between liberals and conservatives regarding Allende. The same may be said for other foreign leaders. Contemporary figures which U.S. policymakers often portray as threatening American vital interests include Hugo Chavez, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and Kim Jong-il. There is room in the Critical Discourse literature to elucidate these more current debates about foreign leaders, possibly even to attempt to predict policy outcomes based on which side appears to be winning the contest over language. This paper has attempted to establish a workable framework for this type of analysis—to identify metaphors used by the policymakers on either side of the debate, then to search for these or similar metaphors, linguistic choices, and overarching narratives in the media to see how it was being packaged for public consumption in the form of newspaper articles, etc. In any case, it is clear that the way the American public and government officials view a leader’s legitimacy and potential to threaten U.S. interests plays a role in U.S. policymaking decisions.


