Of the tasks I have completed over the course of my freshman year at George Washington University, I am by far the most proud of my final research paper for the Women’s Leadership Program Intro to International Affairs class. My own feelings of accomplishment are especially heightened in contrast to the extent to which I struggled writing an equivalent paper first semester. As I had not written an academic research paper before attending GW, I felt overwhelmed by the new structure, unfamiliarity of methods for theory development, and especially limited in my understanding of how to research such a topic. When I reflect on my personal academic growth this year, I feel this paper demonstrates the greatest evolution of my learning—particularly in developing my understanding of research tools. During the process of constructing this paper, I learned better research strategies, while also discovering new resources to use in my search for information.

Last semester, I struggled consistently with developing a theory for my research paper; for my final paper, I decided to be more productive about finding a good fit for my case studies early on, as well as find new sources for more solid arguments. This process began when I decided to attend a presentation given by my professor’s former mentor, Dr. Morrow, on the laws of war. His discussion of weapons prohibitions interested me, and I decided to explore the issue further, seeking out suggestions from both my professor and T.A. Conveniently, they had both recently attended a presentation on the subject, and were able to suggest scholars who would provide alternative arguments. As I continued to do research, especially after selecting my case studies, I began to see that what I had originally considered my “alternative argument” increasingly seemed like the best explanation for the phenomena I was researching.
It was largely thanks to the guidance of Bill Gillis and my Graduate Teaching Assistant, Michelle Jurkovich, that I started seeing signs of success at this point. As I moved into testing my theory against reality, I began communicating with Bill via email, and even stopped into his office a few times to bounce ideas off of him. Bill was able to direct me to a number of resources I perhaps would not have otherwise considered—such as newspaper archives and a variety of primary sources, including reports from the specific organizations involved in my theory, from the time period I was studying. Whereas first semester I had limited myself to primarily the “International Relations” Research Guides found on the GW Library system, Bill pointed out the usefulness of other guides, such as those encompassing journalistic or governmental documents. These ended up being critical when I began exploring norm generation, as they helped show some of the thought process behind the generation of laws.

I simultaneously reached out to G.T.A. Michelle, who suggested “mining the bibliographies” of the works I had already read to gather ideas for further research. She was also instrumental in my success when, frustrated by the limits placed on special collections, I was instead able to borrow a copy of the book I needed from her. In addition, as I was determined to have a solid foundation for my argument, her bibliography suggestion actually gave me the idea to attempt to contact a few of the scholars whose works I had found useful. As most of them were also professors at other universities, they were willing to give me suggestions when I told them I was an undergraduate student. One scholar, Richard Price, gave me suggestions on which of his works would be most relevant to my topic, after I told him I had found one of his journal articles very helpful. Branching out from his suggestions—as well as those from other scholars—I was able to make use of both digital and physical versions of books, journals, and government
reports in my paper. Their suggestions also provided a baseline which allowed me to evaluate the quality of the sources I eventually chose to incorporate within my paper.

As I grew stronger and more confident in my research skills, I was surprised to find myself truly enjoying the process of research. High school never offered me the opportunity to become an “expert” on a specific topic, and as I neared the completion of my paper, I began considering the possibility of going into a research-driven career path. I found the process of gathering, evaluating, and going through sources almost as rewarding as integrating them into the paper, once I became more comfortable with the overall structure. More than the grade I received, or the relief I felt after turning in the completed final product, the pride I felt in being able to see a tangible mark of my own academic progress over the year was incredibly fulfilling.
Network Centrality and Weapon Advocacy

Since the first of the Geneva Conventions in 1864, the international community has attempted to legitimize the prohibition of particular weapons through treaties and official bans. Typically, the decision to ban a weapon is based on “customary international humanitarian law,” as codified by the International Committee of the Red Cross into 161 “rules,” which are frequently updated. ¹ Rules 70 and 71, in particular, have been widely accepted as norms of humane warfare. Rule 70 states: “The use of means and methods of warfare which are of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering is prohibited.” Rule 71 is based off of Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions, which prohibits weapons that are “of a nature to strike military objectives and civilians without distinction.”² However, contemporary scholars have pointed out that some types of weapons still remain in use, despite being “prohibited” under the aforementioned criteria.³ Why is it that some weapons are successfully banned by numerous countries, while others—which may be equally devastating—remain unnoticed?

Before answering this question, I will provide further background on the issue, and explain why it is puzzling. In order to do so, I hope to look at two cases in particular: Chemical Weapons—which were successfully banned by numerous countries—and Napalm—for which no official ban currently exists. I will then apply constructivist Charli Carpenter’s Theory of Network Centrality to explain why some weapons are successfully banned, while others remain

¹ ICRC, "Customary IHL database." Best described as a list of norms, the ICRC bases their “rules” on items found within a number of treaties. The treaties corresponding to each one of the rules are listed beneath the rule itself in the database.
² Additional Protocol I
³ See Carpenter 2011 and Price 1998
in use. According to this theory, the centrality of a few significant NGOs—the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Human Rights Watch in particular—both gives them prominence and positions them to act as gatekeepers, giving them power to set or vet the advocacy agenda. I will explore the history of the ban campaigns in both of my cases in order look for the observable implications expected by Carpenter’s theory. Finally, I will address the primary alternative theory put forth by international relations scholars—one based in the realist paradigm—and briefly critique the Network Centrality theory before concluding.

**Puzzle: Different Responses to Equally Destructive Weapons**

Chemical Weapons scholar Richard Price explores the primary question behind weapons prohibition:

> At first glance, it may seem a platitude to state that the use of chemical weapons (CW) is a particularly reprehensible and morally unacceptable means of conducting armed conflict. Yet how is it that among the countless technological innovations in weaponry that have been used by humankind, CW almost alone have come to be stigmatized as morally illegitimate?\(^5\)

In particular, the use of the incendiary Napalm has long been advocated against as inhumane; having come to represent the controversy of the Vietnam war, and consistently argued against by numerous humanitarian groups since that time, Napalm has nevertheless never been officially prohibited. Whereas a number of treaties forbidding the use of chemical weapons have been put into place, beginning in the late 1800s, Napalm remains untouched. This is not to say, however, that there is a lack of consensus on the atrocity of suffering caused by the use of Napalm on human beings. It is mentioned in Resolution XXIII of the International Conference on Human Rights in 1968, as one of many inhumane treatments that “erode human rights and engender

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counter-brutality.”\textsuperscript{6} Additionally, the application of Rules 70 and 71 (above) should result in the ban of both weapons; the Human Rights Watch recognizes the destructive nature of incendiary weapons, and laments the failure of states to “to live up to [their] promise of protecting civilians from the effects of incendiary weapons, which cause horrific burns, permanent disfigurement, and death.”\textsuperscript{7} Both weapons demonstrate equally devastating results in the field, as I will demonstrate below. Both weapons are equally in violation of established international norms. Both weapons have been denounced by the public, as well as numerous prominent individuals. What causes one form of weapon to be successfully banned, while another, equally horrific instrument of war remains within the arsenal of acceptable warfare?

**Theoretical Basis: Network Centrality and Norm Generation**

Much of contemporary constructivist literature has focused on “[documenting] the power of transnational advocacy networks in ‘global civil society,’ ” writes Carpenter.\textsuperscript{8} While the powerful role played by these TANs is becoming more and more clear, the research community has not yet delved significantly into seeking to explain why these increasingly consequential actors select certain issues to pay attention to and ignore others. As Jefferey Legro asserts in his 1997 treatise on norms, it may be less a question of *which* norms matter, and more a question of *whose* norms matter.\textsuperscript{9} Scholar Clifford Bob already established that certain “NGO superpowers” are responsible for agenda setting in the human rights arena; Carpenter’s work builds on this

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\textsuperscript{8} Charli Carpenter. "Vetting the Advocacy Agenda." 71. See also: Keck and Sikkink 1998; Burgerman 2001; Khagram, Riker nd Sikkink 2002; and Price 2003.

research by showing that the same is true for the weapons advocacy network. Among these prominent network hubs, Carpenter lists “certain United Nations (UN) agencies, key states that championed the concept or are known for funding human security projects, academic institutions, and a few large, well-connected NGOs: International Crisis Group, Human Rights Watch (HRW) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).” According to Carpenter’s theory of Network Centrality, two qualities determine the influence of a transnational actor: its centrality, “a measure of how prominent an organization is within a network, measured in the number of organizations who establish or attempt to establish links with that node”; and the extent to which it acts as a gatekeeper for other organizations, or “possesses exclusive ties to otherwise marginalized or weakly connected nodes or groups of nodes.”

Carpenter borrows a metaphor from A.L. Barabasi to explain the relevancy of centrality:

Trans-national networks, in other words, are less like road systems with many pathways between nodes and more like airlines, where the route between any two small cities generally depends on passing through a major hub; or like the World Wide Web, where hubs like Google and Yahoo are necessary to direct attention to the myriad yet largely invisible “nodes” (Web sites) online.

Centrality allows a major node to easily access resources and information, and the variety and number of the organizations connected to the node also give it greater visibility to targets of influence. This feeds into a cycle results in greater centrality as more and more of the other actors attempt to connect themselves to the central node. Additionally, centrality grants a few key organizations greater legitimacy through name recognition by targets of influence.

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10 Carpenter 2011
11 Carpenter “Vetting the Advocacy Agenda.” 74; Emilie Hafner-Burton, Miles Kahler, and Alex Montgomery. "Network Theory in International Relations." International Organization. 63. no. 3 (2009): 571.
12 Carpenter "Vetting the Advocacy Agenda." 73.
legitimizing effect of network centrality contributes to the extent to which a network node, or hub, is able to act as a gatekeeper for other, smaller organizations. Because a network hub may be the only access point through which smaller organizations can reach their target audience, that node receives disproportionate power in determining which items make it onto the advocacy agenda, and which are passed over by the targets of influence, be they states or UN agencies. In particular, organizations whose work tends to crosscut more than one “issue cluster” are often sought out by others for their ability to “frame” an issue in a variety of ways, or attract a broad coalition.

Repeating the process used above with the realist theory of weapon utility, it is important to establish the observable implications of a theory, and subsequently seek them out in specific case studies. When providing support for her theory, Carpenter establishes clear-cut expectations for the factors that would be present in a successful case, were her theory accurate. Assuming her theory is accurate, one would expect to see the following when the transnational community was successful in garnering widespread acceptance of a weapon ban. First, one would expect to see engagement with the issue early on, by one of the most central organizations in the issue network. Second, it would be likely that a sharp increase the number of countries interested in a ban would be seen immediately—or shortly thereafter—after the organization becomes involved.

Application of Theory: Chemical Weapons

I. Introduction. Most weapon bans only seek to limit the use of specific weapons to certain “acceptable” situations in an effort to increase ratification; the chemical weapons ban, however, is unique both in terms of its widespread acceptance by sovereign states and the comprehensiveness of its coverage. International relations scholar William O’Brien argues,
“…chemical and biological warfare comes the closest to providing an example of totally outlawing a particular means of warfare.”¹⁴ The first chemical weapons ban, the Declaration of the Hague Convention of 1899 prohibiting “the use of projectiles the sole object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases,” actually preceded the development of chemical weaponry.¹⁵ As Richard Price, an influential scholar specializing in the laws of international conflict, explains, “Asphyxiating shells were discussed at The Hague even though they had yet to be developed.”¹⁶ Because the Declaration banned all future uses indiscriminately, however, it established precedence for a total ban in subsequent treaties based on its designation as “customary law”.¹⁷

The unprecedented success of the chemical weapons ban is not surprising, given the advocacy of not one, but two central “nodes” on its behalf. Both prominent in the humanitarian advocacy arena, the World Health Organization (WHO) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) contributed greatly to efforts in favor of a total ban on chemical weapons. The historical records of the campaign to ban chemical weapons meet the observable implications expected by Carpenter. As expected, the organizations meet Carpenter’s expectations for “centrality”—the ICRC and the WHO are listed as the two most central of the organizations in the arms control arena.¹⁸ Furthermore, Carpenter expects that organizations “crosscutting” issue arenas will be more successful in achieving bans; this hypothesis is supported by characteristics

¹⁸ Carpenter, Charli. “Vetting the Advocacy Agenda.” 82.
of both the ICRC and the WHO, both which are involved in multiple areas of health, humanitarianism, and the laws of war. After showing that the actions of these organizations had a demonstrable effect on the success of the chemical weapons ban, it would also be necessary to show that their impact was due to one of the following characteristics of centrality: the organization’s role as gatekeeper, the legitimacy of the organization in the eyes of the “target audience”, or a “bandwagon affect”. This section will demonstrate how the involvement of both organizations directly contributed to the widespread adoption of a succession of chemical weapon bans, supporting Carpenter’s theory of Network Centrality through an in-depth study of both primary and secondary sources addressing the Chemical Weapons ban.

II. History of the ban campaign. Consistent with expectations based on Carpenter’s characteristics of successful bans, the ICRC became involved early on in the campaign to ban chemical weapons. The organization’s first appeal to belligerents was published as early as 1918—less than twenty years after the Hague Convention met, and only five years after the first battlefield use of a CW—declaring their intention to

take a stand against a barbaric innovation which science is bringing to perfection, that is to say making it more lethal and more subtly cruel. This innovation is the use of asphyxiating and poisonous gas, which will it seems [sic] increase to an extent so far undreamed of.  

A year later, after the end of the First World War, they addressed the newly formed League of Nations General Assembly, advocating—among other things—the “absolute prohibition of the use of asphyxiating gas, a cruel and barbarous weapon which inflicts terrible suffering upon its victims.” This admonition was repeated a year later, and resulted in the Geneva Protocol of

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June 17, 1925, “for the prohibition of the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and of bacteriological methods of warfare.”

As Price writes in his book, The Chemical Weapons Taboo, “In the 1920s…gas weapons became an item of public and government concern in Europe and the United States as the result of activity at the international level by organizations such as the Red Cross.”

Despite fears that the battlefields of World War II would bring pervasive use of the most destructive weapons then in existence, there were few defections throughout the course of the war—even when the resulting advantage could have been decisive. According to Price, “the politicization of CW also meant that the burden of proof of what counted as being ‘adequately prepared’ to wage chemical warfare was raised to inordinately high levels, well beyond the level of justification required for other weapons.” Both sides recognized that the German’s decision not to employ gas during the Allied invasion of Normandy cost them an advantage that could have changed the course of the war.

Following World War II, and the Cold War tensions surrounding the newly christened “Weapons of Mass Destruction”—as chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons came to be called—there was a reintroduction of efforts to proscribe the use of chemical weapons. Paralleling this renewed concern for destructive weapons, there was also an explosion of new international organizations in the wake of an increasingly globalized world. However, without the World Health Organization’s treatise on Chemical and Biological Weapons in 1970, the many interconnected networks may not have had the scientific foundation, nor the legitimacy

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23 Mirimanoff, Jean. “The Red Cross and Biological and Chemical Weapons.” 303
25 Price. “A Geneology of the Chemical Weapons Taboo” 76
provided by the central organization, which eventually resulted in the further establishing the chemical weapons. The treatise, entitled “Health Aspects of Chemical and Biological Weapons,” became the premiere source of information on Chemical Weapons, and is referenced in nearly every text on the subject, even today. The utility of their support is expressed within the report itself, where the author writes:

Finally there is the possibility that WHO might be called upon by the United Nations to help deal with allegations of use of chemical and biological weapons between nations and to assist in the limitation of chemical and biological weapons and disarmament. The technical resources of WHO could contribute greatly to the resolution of many of the difficulties that are associated with these problems and are now being discussed within the framework of the United Nations.27

Additionally, the WHO acted as a gatekeeper for other, smaller organizations with similar goals. The success and legitimacy of the Pugwash conferences on Chemical Weapons may be attributed to the influence and recognized expertise of the scientists from WHO. Martin M. Kaplan, The Secretary-General of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs from 1976 to 1988, writes of the WHO’s involvement in creating a scientific foundation for the prohibition of chemical weapons:

With less than a year to organize the CBW meeting in August 1959 it was not easy to secure participation of scientists who could deal with the challenges involved in a subject to which few of them had given much thought. Nevertheless, the conference proved successful. The 26 participants from eight countries included foremost scientists in the fields of biology, epidemiology and ... Several of these distinguished scientists were active participants in WHO Expert Committees and other WHO meetings.28

The incestuous nature of the Pugwash and WHO relationship meant that WHO scientists were often on hand at Pugwash conferences, and despite their unofficial status—they attended in their

28 Kaplan, Martin M. "The efforts of WHO and Pugwash to eliminate chemical and biological weapons—a memoir." 150.
personal capacity, and not as representatives of WHO—it isn’t difficult to imagine the exchange of ideas and information that passed between the two institutional bodies. The value of this relationship was readily evident, as Kaplan writes: “The meeting in Pugwash was the first international gathering of scientists to assess CBW in depth, and its report was valuable in that it alerted and informed the general scientific community.” Further elements of Kaplan’s memoir also show that WHO’s respected status within the international community contributed to its viability with “target audiences,” particularly States. Kaplan relates how his relationship with the Chief Scientific Adviser to the Government of the United Kingdom resulted in the latter asking him whether WHO could construct a detailed report on the technical aspects of Chemical Weapons, and CW’s sister issue, Biological Weapons.

The work done by the WHO at this time was paralleled by the actions of the ICRC. As noted in the 1970 International Review of the Red Cross, the repeated insistence of the Red Cross on behalf of chemical weapon bans resulted in a number of resolutions adopted by the United Nations—“The effect [of which] was to induce a score of States to accede.” Jean Mirimanoff, the review’s author, declared this “an appreciable success, since before 1966 no more than 49 states were parties to the [Geneva] Protocol.” ICRC’s role in the efforts to ban CW, as well as the advantages of access provided by their unique position within the international community, are expressed by the 1970 review: “[The ICRC continue,] in keeping with their long traditions, to support with all their authority, in parallel with their efforts in the cause of peace, the struggle against biological and chemical warfare by negotiations with

29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 Kaplan, Martin M. ”The efforts of WHO and Pugwash to eliminate chemical and biological weapons—a memoir.” 151.
governments and by better informing public opinion.”33 There are, however, certain understandings these NGOs must adhere to in order to maintain their privileged relationship with State governments. Consistent with the hypothesis outlined by Carpenter, much of the legitimacy of these two NGOs in the eyes of States comes from their acknowledgement of war’s legality. As written in a chemical and air warfare compendium for the Conference for the reduction and limitation of weapons: “The ICRC is certainly convinced of the absolute need to replace war by the peaceful settlement of international difficulties, but so long as the possibility of recourse to armed force subsists, it is the Committee’s duty to bear in mind the welfare of all war victims.”34

Although both international organizations played a pivotal role throughout the campaign to establish and strengthen the ban on Chemical Weapons, their success was best realized through the Chemical Weapons Convention of 1993, which created an international organization, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), to act as its governing and enforcement body. In an address to the United States Senate, former President Bill Clinton declared the Convention “unprecedented in its scope,” and described its functions:

The Convention will require States Parties to destroy their chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities under the observation of international inspectors; subject States Parties’ chemical industry to declarations and routine inspection; and subject any facility or location in the territory or any other place under jurisdiction or control of a State Party to international inspection to address other States Parties’ compliance concerns.35

Furthermore, the ICRC notes that the use of chemical weapons has become an international war crime:

It is significant that “employing asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all analogous liquids, materials or devices” is listed in the Statute of the International

33 Ibid. 313.
34 Ibid. 307
Criminal Court as a war crime over which the Court has jurisdiction, and that the crime is not limited to first use of such weapons.\textsuperscript{36}

**Application of Theory: Napalm**

Napalm was frequently brought up at the United Nations, and multiple studies were requested to investigate its legality.\textsuperscript{37} According to an extraction from report on Napalm prepared for the Secretary-General of the United Nations in 1972, “Incendiary weapons are cruel weapons that cause great human suffering.” Additionally, the experts involved in constructing the report emphasized, “Their use is often indiscriminate as regards their targets…[and] because of this there is a need to consider measures for the clearcut prohibition of incendiary weapons.” Despite this clear uncertainty regarding the validity of its use, activists have never succeeded in fully banning Napalm. Accounts of the brutalities forced upon Vietnamese civilians continued to shock American citizens, and provoked numerous war protests from students and full-time anti-war activists alike. Carpenter lists Napalm as highest in terms of “proban transnational activism,” demonstrating the force behind ban advocacy.\textsuperscript{38} A dispatch from Saigon in the *New York Times* on June 5, 1965 elucidated the horrors of the weapon, as well as the nondiscriminatory nature of its use:

As the Communists withdrew from Quangngai last Monday, United States jet bombers pounded the hills into which they were headed. Many Vietnamese—one estimate is as high as 500—were killed by the strikes. The American contention is that they were Vietcong soldiers. But three out of four patients seeking treatment in a Vietnamese hospital afterward for burns from napalm, or jellied gasoline, were village women.\textsuperscript{39}

\textsuperscript{38} Carpenter, Charli. "Vetting the Advocacy Agenda: Network Centrality and the Paradox of Weapons Norms." 83
Carpenter’s theory postulates that, while the use of Napalm is clearly a violation of humanitarian and international laws, the failure of activists to achieve a prohibition is due to the lack of interest from major hubs within the international organizations community, and this hypothesis was strongly supported by my research. First, while Chemical Weapons are the fifth most salient item on the agenda of the major organizations involved with weapons advocacy—with a score of 12—Napalm is not salient at all to these major hubs, and received a score of 0 according to Carpenter’s data.40 According to my research, it was never directly addressed by the top five most central organizations in the arms control arena, even though a few of them—namely ICRC—addressed incendiary weapons at the exclusion of Napalm. The 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, for example, introduced restrictions on incendiary weapons primarily due to concerns stemming from the use of Napalm during the Vietnam war; despite this introduction, however, incendiary weapons were only slightly restricted—battlefield use was not at all limited—and the use of Napalm itself remained intact.41

The activists interested in banning the use of Napalm clearly lacked the legitimacy and connections of the more powerful international organizations involved in the ban campaign for chemical weapons.

Alternative Argument: Structural Realism and Weapon Utility

The end of the Cold War also meant a major shift in the International Relations paradigms. The supposition that states were rational actors, and made choices based on their understanding of relative gains in an international hierarchy of force, began changing as scholars strove to understand the role of norms, institutions and, increasingly, international and non-governmental actors. Nevertheless, realism is far from falling into obscurity, and it does provide a theory-based approach that is important to address.

International Relations scholar Avery Goldstein provides a straightforward explanation of structural realist thought when she writes, “Competition among states coexisting in a condition of insecurity...encourages each to exploit the most strategically effective forms of military power it is able to deploy.” In other words, a state’s decision to use a specific weapon should be based on that weapon’s effectiveness, or military utility, rather than norms of ethical or moral foundation. Under the realist paradigm—which assumes an anarchic world where the security dilemma makes cooperation difficult—it appears logical that weapon use and non-use is based on utility.

In her report to the 2010 Annual Meeting of the American Political Association, entitled “The Battlefield Use of Chemical, Biological and Nuclear Weapons from 1945 to 2008: Structural Realist versus Normative Explanations”, international relations scholar Susan Martin lays out the case for structural realism. She argues that three factors determine battlefield utility: “Whether the weapon has a comparative advantage in a particular role; whether the effects of the weapon are predictable, and whether the destructive power of the weapon poses a significant risk of undesired escalation.” However, in his paper “The Genealogy of the Chemical Weapons Taboo,” Price shows that chemical weapons did in fact possess great utility for belligerents. In
fact, he argues, much of the success of the ban may have been due to fears stemming from the belief “that asphyxiating bombs might be used against towns for the destruction of vast numbers of noncombatants, including women and children, while torpedoes at sea are used only against the military and naval forces of the enemy.” Far from discarding chemical weapons due to lack of utility, a belief in their strength actually provided ammunition for parties in favor of their prohibition.

Even when focusing solely on treaty dissenters, and assuming they refuse to sign out of value for the weapon’s utility, states’ actual behavior frequently does not match up with this theory’s expected results. For example, during World War II, Britain chose to adhere to the restriction of submarine warfare—even after German defected, and even after evidence showed the utility of submarines:

At the end of a 1939 exercise, a submarine officer accurately reported to a hall of one thousand sailors that torpedoes had hit 22 percent of their targets. Instead of the normal questions, Admiral Forbes, the commander of the Home Fleet, stood up, declared that the officer was clearly wrong and that 3 percent was the correct figure, and the session ended.

Structural realism fails to explain why some states choose to initiate bans when realist scholars would expect a desire to maintain a variety of strategic options.

Weaknesses in Carpenter’s Theory

As demonstrated above, the theory of Network Centrality remains the best explanation for the discrepancy in success rates of similar weapon ban. However, as no theory can be perfectly tailored to fit all cases, there are some aspects of this theory which either require more research, or do not appear to be supported by the results from the cases. One concern with

43 Legro, Jeffery. “Revisiting the ‘Failure’ of Internationalism.” 51
Carpenter’s theory is that it may be self-reinforcing. Carpenter states at one point in her paper, “My model predicts a strong correlation between the agenda of these particular organizations [the ICRC and the Arms Division of the HRW] and the overall issue agenda in the broader area of weapons bans.” It is possible that their connection to a large number of smaller organizations would cause them to pick up an issue already popularized throughout the network by another actor. It would then be difficult to tell—solely by looking at the timeline of issue adoption—whether this was a case of widespread interest, or whether the node was merely fulfilling its role as gatekeeper in adopting issues it found relevant or important from smaller organizations. However, these relatively minor inquiries could be easily cleared up by further research exploring the timelines of minor, as well as major organizations, and are outweighed by the strength of evidence in favor of Carpenter’s theory.

Conclusions

It is important to consider that the penetrating influence of the International Committee of the Red Cross and the World Health Organization in the campaign to ban chemical weapons began even before international organizations became widespread in the post-Cold War era. Despite this fact, the interventions of the two organizations were clearly instrumental in the success of the ban, both in terms of its comprehensive coverage of all types of chemical weapons, and the number of countries which signed on to each of the increasingly stringent bans. When held in contrast to the failed attempts to ban an equally horrific weapon, Napalm, the power held by a small number of interconnected NGOs becomes even more evident. My research clearly supports Carpenter’s theory, and opens the door to further research along this same vein exploring the role of international organizations in determining the advocacy agenda.

44 Carpenter "Vetting the Advocacy Agenda." 81.


